BY DON MOGARTE SUNDAY TIMES MAGAZINE CONTRIBUTORPolice chief Supt. Nicanor Bartolome assumed the post as director of the National Capital Region Command at a time when the region’s police force was still reeling from the aftermath of the bungled hostage crisis on August 23. Inevitably, much is expected of Bartolome as he leads a force that has been beaten black and blue by critics.
University sociologist and police matters expert Ariston Centeno believes that the most pressing task at hand is for the new regional police chief to put order in the house and boost the morale of the men and women of the police force.
Optimistically, Centeno says that Bartolome’s vast experience in troubled Mindanao (his first job in the police force saw him in action in Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato) as a decorated police officer has prepared him to take on the challenges of overseeing the nation’s capital and its surrounding cities.
“Manila is most demanding in terms of maintaining peace and order. That is a tough job and it requires a well-rounded police officer. Gen. Bartolome has a lot of work to do. All eyes are on him,” Centeno points out.
Urban terrorism and a growing number of criminal elements are just two of the daunting problems facing Metro Manila. Given these, Centeno says Bartolome should always be on his toes everyday to make sure that the Metro police force is always prepared to maintain peace and thwart any attempt to disrupt law and order.
Critic Andres Caro, meanwhile, warns Bartolome that he should not repeat the same mistakes of his predecessor.
“He should inspire—and that inspiration should be manifested down the line. More than that, what we want to see is police readiness and preparedness in the event another crisis erupts,” he stresses.
It also helps that Bartolome has served some of the most popular Philippine National Police (PNP) chiefs, who certainly have different personalities—from Roberto Lastimoso to Panfilo Lacson to Jesus Verzosa, among others.
“I just hope that with him around, the National Capital Regional Police Office [NCRPO] will be able to redeem itself from the public outrage it received as a result of the hostage incident,” Centeno points out.
Voice of the PNP
For years, Bartolome was mass media’s access to the PNP being the organization’s spokesman. As the alter ego of the national police chief and the voice of thousands of policemen in the country, he certainly learned the ropes of dealing with members of the media.
A journalist who has been covering the police beat for many decades, shares that Bartolome treats every member of media with respect. “He does not discriminate whether a reporter writes for a tabloid or a broadsheet. He values deadlines and knows how to answer even the most stupid questions na hindi mapapahiya yung magtatanong [in a way that will save the reporter from embarssment],” recalls Maricel Cruz, a former Crame beat reporter.
Of course, Bartolome has his own share of criticisms, too. As PNP’s spokesman, he was unfazed though, knowing full well that it was part of his territory.
Decorated police officer
A side from his impressive track records in Mindanao, Bartolome has also proved his expertise in the areas of police management, police-community relations and logistics.
With his illustrious track record in the national police, Bartolome’s appointment on October 15 as the new chief of the NCRPO came as no surprise to many of his colleagues.
Bartolome graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in 1980 and that same year, he was shipped to become a platoon leader of the 54th Philippine Constabulary Battalion in Maguindanao.
For six years, from 1980 to 1986, Bartolome served in Mindanao. He was the Ex-O of the 441 PC Company in Lanao del Norte and 457 PC Company in North Cotabato. He later became commanding officer of the 480 PC Company in Cotabato City.
After the historic EDSA Revolution in 1986, Bartolome became an instructor at the PC Training Command in Cavite. He held this position until 1988. From the passion of classroom teaching, Bartolome returned to Mindanao, this time as chief of the Military Training Group in Camp Parang in Maguindanao.
He held the position for three years before being appointed in 1990 as commanding officer of the 480 Police Mobile Group in Cotabato City.
In 1993, he was chosen to head the Real Property Management Division under the PNP Headquarters’ Directorate for Logistics.
In between his busy schedule as police officer, Bartolome furthered his education by taking up a Masteral Degree in Business Administration at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, a course he finished in 1995.
From taking care of the national police’s logistics, he was appointed as administration, budget and fiscal officer of the PNP’s Directorate for Research and Development.
At the same time, he was privileged to be an instructor at the National Police Agency in Japan where he shared his expertise.
He then became the PNP spokesman and chief of the PNP Public Information Office in 1999, a position he held until 2001.
From there, his next posting was as chief of the Directorial Staff of the PNP Headquarters Support Service.
He was then appointed and served as provincial director of the Tarlac Police Provincial Office. After finishing his tenure in Tarlac, he was back again as national police spokesman and Philippine Intelligence Operation chief from 2007 to 2009.
Also in 2009, he finished his Doctorate of Philosophy in Criminology at the Philippine College of Criminology in Manila.
From June 2009 to August 2010, he held the positions of director of the PNP Community Relations Group and regional director of PNP in Region IV-A.
Throughout his career, Bartolome received awards that became testaments to his dedication and service to the country.
For three consecutive years from 1983 to 1985, Bartolome was named PC Junior Officer of the Year in Central Mindanao and nationwide.
Other medals and citations include: two Distinguished Service Medals, four Special Service Medals, two Heroism Medals, 19 Efficiency Medals, two Outstanding Achievement Medals, two Good Conduct Medals, one Bronze Cross Medal, 13 PNP Merit Medals, 10 Military Merit Medals, seven Military Commendation Medals and 14 PNP Commendation Medals.
Moreover, he was made PC TRACOM Officer of the Year in 1989, received the District Director of the Year in 1992, PPSC President’s Award in 1998, PMA Cavalier Award for Special Field in 1999, Best Senior PCO of the Year in 2003 and 2004, PMA Cavalier Award for Staff Functions in 2006, Provincial Director of the Best Police Provincial Office of the Year in Central Luzon in 2006, and Best Senior PCO of the Year in the field of Operation in Central Luzon in 2006.
Solid commitment
As NCRPO chief, Bartolome is focusing on making sure that Metro Manila is safe from terrorist threats and at the same time, the police force under his leaderships is going after gangs and criminal elements.
He is a believer in the importance of police and community partnership in attaining a climate of peace.
He knows that the road ahead is strewn with stumbling blocks, but as he says in his assumption speech (see sidebar), quoting a Chinese proverb, “We must keep on stepping.”
‘A more credible, reliable and effective service to the public’
NCRPO chief Director Bartolome’s acceptance speech at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, October 15, 2010.
A Chinese proverb says that “To get through the hardest journey, we need to take only one step at a time, but we must keep on stepping.”
An assumption of a new post can be considered a tough journey. Now, as I take over the post as the new regional director of the NCRPO (National Capital Region Police Office), I am well aware that I am in for a difficult expedition ahead.
But another saying also mentions that it is not destination that matters but the journey and the lessons that you have learned along the way.
Indeed, the PNP (Philippine National Police) particularly the NCRPO, has been on a hard journey, but these obstacles should serve as a motivation to improve and enhance the capability of the men and women of the NCRPO.
With this in mind, allow me to thank our Chief of the PNO, Director Gen. Raul M. Bacalzo for his faith and confidence in giving me the post of the NCRPO Regional Director.
Like I have said, I am well aware that I have my work cut out for me, but I am prepared to take on the challenges.
Allow me also to extend my gratitude to Police Director Leocadio Santiago for his support as I take over
the NCRPO command.
As the Chinese proverb says, we must keep on stepping. That is why I would like to ask for the support and cooperation of every uniformed and non-uniformed personnel of the NCRPO as we step together in serving and providing a more credible, reliable and effective service to the public.
I look forward to starting this new chapter of my journey with all of you, and I do hope that with everyone working together, we can make the NCRPO achieve even greater heights.
Thank you everyone.
Mabuhay ang PNP at ang NCRPO
THANK YOU EVERYONE.
MABUHAY ANG PNP AT ANG NCRPO.
From 12 hours of agony to weeks of blame and controversy
Monday, August 23, at about 10 a.m.: Dismissed chief Senior Insp. Rolando Mendoza takes 25 passengers in a tourist bus hostage in Intramuros.
Between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m.: Mendoza releases some of the hostages while negotiations are ongoing.
Between 2 and 3 p.m.: Mendoza starts posting messages on the bus window: “Big mistake to correct a big wrong decision,” “Big deal will start after 3 p.m. today.”
3 p.m.: Negotiators give in to Mendoza’s demand to refuel the bus. Mendoza’s brother Gregorio talks to him on the phone and asks for an extension of the deadline.
3:30 p.m.: Mendoza posts a message that read “Media now.”
Between 3:30 p.m. and 6 p.m.: Mendoza releases another hostage. Food is delivered to the hostages. Negotiations are still ongoing.
6 p.m.: A letter from the Ombudsman is given to Mendoza.
At about 7 p.m.: Mendoza’s brother, Gregorio is arrested.
At about 7:30 p.m.: The bus driver escapes and says all the hostages had been killed.
Between 7:30 and 8:30 p.m.: Gunshots are heard from the bus. Members of the Special Weapons and Tactics start assault operations.
At about 8:40 p.m.: The dead body of the hostage taker is seen. Police secures the area and rescues surviving hostages.
August 24, 12:30 a.m.: President Benigno Aquino 3rd holds a televised press conference.
August 26: The Senate conducts hearing on the bungled hostage taking operations where all officials involved in the incident are invited to tell their stories and shed light on the incident.
Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Palace convenes the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) during the first week of September.
September 6: The IIRC is formed to probe the bloody August 23 hostage taking in Manila.
The IIRC probe holds a five-day marathon hearing. The team also went to the Manila hostage site to also include in the report their observations there.
In between hearings, the IIRC sent two teams to Hong Kong to interview survivors of the incident and retrieve three of eight cell phones turned over earlier to authorities of the Chinese territory.
Justice Secretary Leila de Lima said the first team, composed of Philippine National Police-Scene of the Crime Operatives (PNP-SOCO), left the country at about 7:55 a.m. The second team was composed of a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and officers of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The police team is composed of Superintendents Lorlie Nilo Arroyo and Reynaldo Dimalanta de Guzman, while the NBI-DOJ is composed of Assistant State Prosecutor Cielito Celi, NBI head agent Danielito Lalusis and ballistician Perla Landicho.
September 17: The IIRC finally submits advance copy of its report regarding the August 23 bus hostage crisis to President Aquino, according to Secretary Ricky Carandang, head of the presidential communications group.
The President received the report from the IIRC headed by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima who said that “parts of the report will include recitation of facts, evaluation of facts, identifying who is accountable for the tragedy and the recommendations.”
The IIRC stated at least 10 people in government and media sectors will be held answerable for the hostage tragic ending.
Mr. Aquino formed a review panel headed by the Palace legal team, headed by Ed de Mesa and Executive Secretary Pacquito Ochoa, to further review recommendations of the IIRC.
The receipt of the report came during the time when President Aquino was about to leave for a seven-day official trip to US on September 20. A day before he left the country, the President said that the announcement of the findings would be done upon his return from US. He vowed at a news conference that the copies of the report would be available and accessible online.
At the same press conference, de Mesa hinted that “we are upholding most of the recommendations . . . (there would be) just a realignment of certain charges.”
Mr. Aquino said he wanted to make sure the charges that will be filed would prosper in court.
Upon the President’s return to the country, Malacañang once again reset the date for the release puff the results of its legal review of the IIRC report.
Prior to his US trip, Aquino said the review would be out October 6, but a “draft” of the said report was leaked to media (an ABS-CBN report dated October 8) “absolving” some officials involved in the incident.
It was during the second week of October when President Aquino announced at a news conference the results of the IIRC report. He concurred with the findings of the leaked Palace report on the IIRC recommendations.
The National Peace and Order Council, the Crisis Management Committee and other things the experts didn’t know
The issue of accountability in the Quirino hostage crisis has been muddled in the dizzying media reports, accusations from left and right, numerous commentaries made by self-appointed experts, and in some ways, even the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) report. The media, critics and bodies such as the IIRC point to the culpability of various offices and individuals.
So far, however, there appears to be no clear systematic framework being used in assigning culpability. One question that begs to be asked is this: In the light of the value we, as a society, place on the sometimes conflicting views on accountability, press freedom, national security and right to life, what is a fair and just basis for apportioning responsibility in this particular case? Is there a basis for the indictment of the current public officials taking the blame or are we missing something?
1. Policy Framework
It is clear that the process of ensuring accountability cannot be treated in an unsystematic and arbitrary manner. It should be grounded in the relevant national policies and laws. The IIRC report and the media have repeatedly pointed out to the Crisis Management Manual. Little mention, however, has been made about other relevant policies that need to be considered.
Executive Order (EO) 309 of 1987, EO 320 of 1988, Memorandum Circular 121 of 2000, EO 773 of 2009, the Crisis Management Manual of 2000, and the Hostage Negotiations Manual collectively provide the legal and administrative basis for the Peace and Order Councils and the Crisis Management Committees, and outlines their roles in responding to threats to peace and order, including terrorism and hostage situations. It also outlines the roles and responsibilities that each and every agency and official is expected to perform.
2. Peace and Order Councils
The National Peace and Order Council (NPOC) is tasked to contribute to the strategies of the National Security Council, coordinate and monitor, and serve as a forum for deliberation for peace and order concerns. This executive body in essence plans, monitors, and oversees the manner by which authorities respond to peace and order issues and problems at the national level. [1]
2.1. The NPOC is chaired by the secretary of Interior and Local Government (SILG). Its members include: the secretaries of the Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of National Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Health, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Transportation and Communications, Department of Education, and the Executive Secretary and Press Secretary. Also members are the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. It further includes the chairmen of the Dangerous Drugs Board, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. It also counts the Director General of the National Security Council (NSC), the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, as well as three representatives from the private sector appointed by the President of the Philippines. [2] Peace and
Order Councils exist at the national level, as well as the regional, provincial, city, and municipal levels.
2.2. The Regional Peace and Order Councils (RPOCs) are composed of the region’s Provincial Governors, the Mayors of the Highly Urbanized Cities, the Presidents of the Leagues of Municipalities, representatives of component cities and the private sector, and wherever applicable, the regional counterparts of the departments, offices and agencies enumerated in the NPOC. The Chairman and Vice Chairman are appointed by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary with the approval of the President of the Philippines. [3]
2.3. The Provincial Peace and Order Councils (PPOC) are headed by the Provincial Governors as Chairman and the Vice Governors as Vice Chairman. Its members are composed of one representative of the Sangguniang Lalawigan, three representatives from the private sector, and wherever applicable, the provincial counterparts of the departments, offices and agencies as enumerated in the NPOC. [4]
2.4. The City or Municipal Peace and Order Council (CPOC or MPOC) are headed by the Mayor as Chairman and the Vice Mayor as Vice Chairman. Its membership consists of one representative or the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, three representatives from the private sector, and the municipal counterparts of the departments, offices and agencies as enumerated in the NPOC, wherever applicable. [5]
2.5. The RPOCs, PPOCs, CPOCs, and MPOCs are tasked to perform similar duties and functions as the NPOC, at their level of jurisdiction. As per E.O. 773, this includes: [6]
· Serving as a forum for dialogue and deliberation of major issues and problems affecting peace and order coming up with measures which will improve or enhance peace and order and public safety;
· Recommending measures to converge and orchestrate internal security operations efforts of civil authorities and agencies, military and police;
· Applying moral suasion to and/or recommend sanctions against local chief executives who are giving material and political support to the Communist rebels;
· Monitoring the provision of livelihood and infrastructure development programs and projects in the remote rural and indigenous population areas adopted to isolate them from the Communist rebels;
· Agitating/arousing, organizing and mobilizing ideological, political and organization works;
· And performing all other functions assigned by law, the President or the NPOC.
3. Crisis Management Committees (CMCs)
As per Philippine government policy, all terrorist-based crises (including hostage situations) are generally police matters and shall be handled as such unless the situation escalates into that which requires a higher unit of authority to carry out the government’s Anti-Terrorism Policy. [7]
3.1. Crisis Management Committees (CMCs) are designated to handle “terrorist-based” crisis, which include hostage situations. The CMC is activated by the appropriate level of the POC with jurisdiction over the incident to “direct the mobilization of necessary government resources to assist in the resolution of a crisis.” It is also tasked to “set the mode of interoperability between concerned agencies to ensure that operational demands during the crisis period are aptly met, and all government actions are coordinated and complementary.” [8]
3.2. In the event of terrorist activities (including hostage taking), the local commander of the PNP is tasked to immediately take all necessary steps to resolve the crisis and/or prevent it from escalating. A higher PNP unit such as the provincial or regional command should immediately take full control and responsibility of the situation, if the crisis is beyond the operational capability of the local PNP unit, “when its judgment calls for such an action.” [9] If a crisis is not resolved at the local police level, the POC of the municipality or province affected by the crises immediately convenes and immediately organizes/activates a CMC headed by the concerned local chief executive (the mayor or governor as the case may be) with guidance from the national government, in accordance with the Crisis Management Manual. [10]
3.3. The CMC orchestrates all efforts to resolve a crisis through careful coordination of all agencies concerned. It is not the negotiating team. Thus, local executives or CMC members shall refrain from acting as negotiators or mediators so as not to raise the stakes in a hostage crisis situation. The CMC, instead, designates an official negotiator preferably from the pool of trained negotiators from the PNP or AFP. [11] At the same time, the CMC tasks the police and/or the military to craft and prepare a contingency plan for the use of reasonable force if peaceful measures are exhausted. The local CMC ensures the continuity of all government actions and efforts on the groundntil its responsibility has been assumed by a higher CMC or agency of the national government. [12]
3.4. When a crisis has evolved into a military situation where the perpetrators have preponderant military capability, the AFP unit having jurisdiction over the affected municipality or province shall take a proactive role to assist the PNP and local governments concerned in resolving the crisis. [13] Other government agencies, when requested, shall render assistance to the local or national CMC according to their mandates and expertise at all stages of the crisis. [14]
4. The National Crisis Management Committee
4.1. Incidents arising from public law and order problems are normally handled by the National Peace and Order Council (NPOC). [15] If a situation arises from internal security threats and evolves into a national security concern, the Cabinet Cluster “E” or the Cabinet Cluster on Security and Political Development is activated and designated as the national CMC tasked to deal with the situation. The national CMC includes the Secretaries of Interior and Local Government, Justice, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and the Director-General of the National Security Council as well as the Presidential Legislative Liaison Officer for the Senate and the House of Representatives. [16] The national CMC may take over the responsibilities of the local CMC, or give strategic and policy guidance in support of their efforts. [17]
4.2. The Cluster “E” acting as the national CMC may designate a lead Cabinet member who is the head of the lead agency or the office of primary responsibility (OPR) that is addressing the situation on the ground, to oversee the implementation of the Policy or strategic guidance of the Cluster “E.” The OPR and its head shall have the flexibility to configure the task units/ entities and utilize the resources and agencies of the department concerned to effectively ensure unity of command. [18] In the case of the Quirino hostage incident, the general consensus is that the DILG is the office of primary responsibility.
Sources:
[1] E.O. 309, and EO 320 as amended by EO 773 of 2009 Section 2.a to d.
[2] Ibid, Section 1.a.
[3] Ibid, Section 1. b.
[4] Ibid, Section 1. c.
[5] Ibid, Section 1. d.
[6] Ibid, Section 3. a to f
[7] Memorandum Circular No. 121 of 2000 C.5
[8] Ibid, Section C.6
[9] Ibid, Section D.1
[10] Ibid, Section D.2.a.
[11] Ibid, Section D.2.b.
[12] Ibid, Section D.2.c and d
[13] Ibid, Section D.3.c and d
[14] Ibid, Section D.5.a
[15] Memorandum Circular No. 121 of 2000, Section D.4.a
[16]http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/integra/volume1/philippines/1pl01a01.htm#ClusterE:SecurityandPoliticalDevelopment
[17] Ibid, Section D.4.b and c
[18] Ibid, Section D.4.d
Source: http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/sunday-times/29780-police-chief-supt-nicanor-bartolomea-new-brand-of-service
